1. Hate speech and pornography 1
whip up hatred. Here, for instance, is an extract from Ernst Hiemer's 'The Holy Hate', in a 1943 issue of Der Stürmer:
We as a people will survive this war only if we eliminate weakness and 'politeness' and respond to the Jews with an equal hatred. We must always keep in mind what the Jew wants today, and what he plans to do with us. If we do not oppose the Jews with the entire energy of our people, we are lost. But if we can use the full force of our soul that has been released by the National Socialist revolution, we need not fear the future. The devilish hatred of the Jews plunged the world into war, need and misery. Our holy hate will bring us victory and save all of mankind. 6 No epithets there, but this kind of anti-Semitic propaganda was effective, and considered grounds enough for its editor, Julius Streicher, to be tried at Nuremberg and executed for war crimes. There are plenty of reasons for philosophers to extend their interest beyond epithets. Here we shall be looking at politically problematic speech construed more broadly, with a focus on pornography and hate speech.
These forms of speech are hardly paradigms of what a political philosopher like Mill had in mind, when he argued that free speech could help us achieve true beliefs.
They are hardly paradigms of what a philosopher of language like Stalnaker has in mind, when he suggests that the principal reason for speech is to get people to know things they didn't know before. Nonetheless I want to explore some possibilities for mutual illumination, which may prove the brighter if we are willing to consider some (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), 128-141; Michael Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Language (Oxford: Duckworth, 1973) . 6 Ernst Hiemer, 'The Holy Hate', Der Stürmer, ed. Julius Streicher (Streicher Verlag, amendments that take us beyond the knowledge-oriented starting points of Mill and Stalnaker-amendments, in short, that take us beyond belief.
2. What is racial hate speech?
The United Nations requires its member states to combat racial hate speech:
State Parties condemn all propaganda and all organizations which are based on ideas or theories of superiority of one race or group of persons of one colour or ethnic origin, or which attempt to justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination in any form, and undertake to adopt immediate and positive measures designed to eradicate all incitement to, or acts of, such discrimination and, to this end [...] shall declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons of another colour or ethnic origin. 7 This proposal points us towards a conception of hate speech as, among other things, propaganda. Here are some more gems from the Streicher-Hiemer collaboration, this time aimed at a young readership:
Example 3. The Poison Mushroom, 1938: Title Story. The illustration depicts a mother and young son in the woods, mushroom hunting. The caption reads, 'Just as it is often hard to tell a toadstool from an edible mushroom, so too it is often very hard to recognize the Jew as a swindler and a criminal.'
The Experience of Hans and Else with a Strange Man. Large, ominous hook-nosed figure doles sweets to small blond children. 'Here, kids, I have some candy for you. But you both have to come with me...' topic, see Sarah Jane Leslie, 'The Original Sin of Cognition: Race, Prejudice and Generalization', forthcoming in the Journal of Philosophy. While many member states have implemented laws putting these principles into effect, the U.S. is an exception; its 1994 ratification was accompanied by a reservation pointing out that the requirement was incompatible with constitutional protection of speech. What is going on, in hate speech, as described by the UN, and illustrated here?
According to the UN description, racial hate speech disseminates ideas based on racial superiority; it promotes racial hatred and discrimination-'promotes' in a causal sense. It also incites racial discrimination and hatred, and promotes racial hatred and discrimination-'promotes' in an advocacy sense. In terms that J. L. His speech was an illocutionary act: he 'incited' his countrymen to persecute the Jews.
As a result, his speech was also a perlocutionary act, with effects on his hearers' mental states and actions, as they became 'infected' with anti-Semitism.
Besides working as a kind of propaganda, hate speech may sometimes work as a kind of assault. In the UN description, the envisaged hearers are other racists, or case of racial hate speech, we shall focus on pornography that is not directed specifically to women as hearers.
Game plan: limits
We are going to be looking at what pornography and hate speech may have in common.
This means we'll be leaving aside some interesting questions in the vicinity that deserve attention. we will say that, just as in a baseball game, the beliefs of players and spectators change in response to changes in the abstract score, in like manner the beliefs of speakers and hearers change in response to the abstract conversational score. If we think in Stalnaker's terms, the connection will be even more direct: altering the shared 'common ground' just is altering the shared 'common belief'. On an oversimplifying assumption, conversational score, common ground, and common belief, are pretty much the same thing, in his framework. It's true that Stalnaker sometimes identifies common ground with common acceptance, a broader attitude that includes belief but also assumption and pretence. 34 But basically, on Stalnaker's approach the shared common ground is identified with certain belief-like propositional attitudes of the speakers; so there is no mystery about how altering common ground could also alter attitudes. 
Problem cases: desire and hate
There is no mystery then, on the pragmatic approach, about how pornography and hate speech might alter factual and normative beliefs of consumers, in altering the 'conversational score' or 'common ground' shared between speakers and hearers. We 34 Stalnaker, 'Common Ground'. A further caveat involves the issue of pretence in pornography, which may mean that we cannot move from common ground to belief quite so directly. The question of how beliefs about the world can be altered by fiction is another topic of our paper 'Scorekeeping in a Pornographic Language Game'.
can try to say that, even in the case of the fetishized boots, viewers, or 'hearers', are accommodating to what the material presupposes, namely that the boots are sexy. Only on that assumption does their inclusion in the series make sense. To say that the sexiness of the boots is 'presupposed' would gives us a change in the conversational score, in Lewis's terms; a change in the common ground, in Stalnaker's terms. Hearers, or viewers, take on board the presupposition that boots are sexy, and incorporate that into their beliefs.
But hold on a minute. Believing the boots are sexy is one thing. Finding them sexy is quite another. How on earth does that change in desire come about? There is something missing, in this pragmatic picture of how norms and beliefs alter in response to conversational moves, and how pornography and hate speech shape them. In addition to changing beliefs, pornography and hate speech evidently change the desires of consumers. People who consume pornography come to find desirable things they did not find desirable before. They don't just believe something about boots: they desire something about boots. People who consume anti-Semitic propaganda don't just come to believe something about Jews: their desires also change-they want to avoid Jews, or destroy them. It's not just that consumers come to believe different descriptive or normative propositions. It's that they come to want different things than they did before.
What goes for desire also goes for hate. Hearers don't just believe differently than they did before, they feel differently than they did before. It is no mystery, on the pragmatic approach, how hearers come to believe something about Jews, for example, that good Germans hate Jews. But how do we get from the philosopher's story about belief acquisition, to these changes in desire and hate? 35 We attend briefly to it in Langton and West, 'Scorekeeping'.
Evidently the psychological 'conditioning model' of how some speech works has no problem dealing with this question, giving us an easy non-rational account of how desire and emotion get changed. It is no mystery how desire gets 'conditioned' to a previously neutral 'stimulus' that happens to be speech, any more than there is a mystery understanding how Pavlov's dogs 'learned' to salivate when they heard the bell. The pragmatic model, by contrast, gives us an adequate story about how belief change can be achieved, through subtle conversational moves adjusting the 'common ground' or 'score'; but it seems inadequate to the task of addressing change in feeling and desire. Should we just throw up our hands at this point, and cede this territory to the psychologist?
Perhaps we can do a little better than that.
An exploratory proposal: the accommodation of desire and hate
I want to propose, in an exploratory spirit, the idea that the phenomenon of accommodation might extend beyond belief-beyond conversational score, and common ground, as originally conceived-to include accommodation of other attitudes, including desire and hatred. My remarks here will inevitably be programmatic. But to convey the general idea: just as a hearer's belief can spring into being, after the speaker presupposes that belief, so too a hearer's desire can spring into being, after the speaker presupposes the hearer's desire; and so too, a hearer's hatred can spring into being, after the speaker presupposes that hatred. Stalnaker's common ground can perhaps be extended to include not just common beliefs, and other belief-like attitudes, but common desires, and common feelings, as well. Speakers invite hearers not only to join in a shared belief world, but also a shared desire world, and a shared hate world. I am interested here in the implications of this for pornography and hate speech, but if my hunches are right, there are pretty clearly some implications for a host of other very ordinary speech situations as well.
Recall that for Stalnaker, it is a desideratum thatthe pragmatic notions developed to explain the linguistic phenomena be notions that help to connect the practice of speech with purposes for which people engage in the practice. 36 For Stalnaker the paradigm case, embodying 'the principal reason for speech', is where 'people say things to get other people to come to know things that they didn't know before'. But there are many other reasons for which people engage in the practice of speech. The gaining of knowledge may be one principal reason for speech. But an alien arriving on earth might be as likely to conclude from his observations that the principal reason for speech was the gaining of money… More generally, a great deal of speech aims, not at getting people to know things they didn't know before, but at getting them to want things they didn't want before, and feel things they hadn't felt before.
While our topic here is politically problematic speech, hate speech and pornography, it will readily be seen that the idea extends to a great deal of informal conversation, and presumably much advertising.
Let us see how our pragmatic story might be adapted to say something about the accommodation of desire and hate.
First, a little more thought about accommodation. One can think about the 'common ground' or 'score' that accommodates the moves speakers make in two importantly different ways: first as an abstract structure, analogous to the 'score' of a baseball game (which I take to be Lewis's approach); or as simply the attitudes of parties to the conversation, analogous to the beliefs of players and bystanders about the score of the baseball game (which I take to be Stalnaker's approach). These do not necessarily compete, and I find it helpful to see the phenomenon of accommodation as occurring at both of these levels. In baseball, a player makes a move. This then alters the abstract score of the game, and alters facts about what is normatively appropriate in the game. These alterations work, in Austin's terms, non-causally, in the way that illocutionary acts work. A player's move does not strictly cause the score to change: the score is an abstract structure, whose being is constituted by what the player has done.
Just as smashing the bottle and saying the right words christens the ship, so hitting a home run changes the score.
As I see it, Lewis's account of 'conversational score' as structure, is tracking change enacted 'straightway', at Austin's illocutionary level ('straightway' is Lewis's word). Then the effects occur afterwards, among them effects on attitudes of parties to the game, effects that do not happen 'straightway', but as real time psychological consequences. As I see it, Stalnaker's understanding of 'common ground' as attitude, is tracking change brought about causally, at Austin's perlocutionary level. Bystanders come to believe that the player has hit a home run; they come to believe that the score has changed, and that the facts about what is normatively appropriate in the game have changed accordingly. We should welcome an understanding of accommodation that makes sense of change that occurs at both of these levels: first, abstract and illocutionary; second, attitudinal and perlocutionary.
How does the score-as-abstract-structure interact with the common-ground-as This appeal may take the form of a quasi-pretence: the way to make the appeal is to go on as if the hearer had the relevant attitude already. 38 The most straightforward one will be a cognitive appeal: 'Have the belief that fits this score!' To take up an earlier example, this might be: 'Believe that Jews often kidnap children!'; 'Believe it is appropriate to hate Jews!'; 'Believe that good Germans hate Jews!'; and 'Believe that good Germans avoid Jews!' The way a speaker makes these appeals is, often, to go on as if the hearers had these attitudes already. A speaker can invite someone into their belief-world by taking for granted that the hearer is already in that belief-world. 37 These accommodations might come apart, e.g. in a case where a legislator enacts a law, and people fail to believe that he has done so. 38 Stalnaker, 'Common Ground'; Jay David Atlas, 'Presupposition', in Laurence R. Sometimes the conative appeal may be grounded in the cognitive appeal. For a hearer who antecedently desires to avoid kidnappers, the news that Jews are kidnappers can be offered as grounding a desire to avoid Jews. For a hearer who wants to be a 'good German', the news that good Germans avoid Jews can likewise be offered as grounding a desire to avoid Jews.
I also want to suggest that the conative appeal may sometimes be direct, in a way that doesn't rely on antecedent desire. Speech can surely, sometimes, create a new desire directly, through an appeal not depending on what the hearer previously desired. Hume thought of desires as 'original existences', about whose rational origins little can be said; but there seems little doubt that speech is prominent among the many possible wellsprings of desire. We have a multi-billion dollar advertising industry attesting to that fact, advertising which often makes a skilful direct appeal, aiming to 52. I can't here address adequately the ways in which presupposition accommodation involves something like pretence.
create a desire to buy something, independent of anything the hearer might have desired before. As with advertising, perhaps too with anti-Semitic propaganda, there might be a direct appeal, aiming to create a desire to be rid of Jews, independent of anything the hearer might have desired before. And perhaps this direct conative appeal can be made, as in the case of a cognitive appeal, by going on as if the hearer had the desire already. A speaker can invite someone into their desire-world by taking for granted that the hearer is already in that desire-world.
A psychological accommodation then follows, as a causal effect of the attitudinal appeal. Hearers come to desire to avoid Jews.
In addition to cognitive and conative appeal, the abstract score may invoke an emotional appeal: 'Have emotions that fit this score!' For our example, this may simply be: 'Hate Jews!' As in the case of conative appeal, sometimes the emotional appeal may be grounded in the cognitive appeal. For a hearer who is antecedently disposed to hate kidnappers, the factual news that Jews are kidnappers can be offered as grounding a hatred of Jews. For a hearer disposed to feel what he believes it's appropriate to feel, the normative news that 'It is appropriate to hate Jews' can be offered as grounding a hatred of Jews. For a hearer disposed to hate what he believes good Germans hate, the news that good Germans hate Jews might likewise be offered as grounding a hatred of Jews.
But again I want to suggest that the emotional appeal may sometimes be more direct, in a way that doesn't rely on antecedent attitudes. Speech can surely, sometimes, create a new emotion directly, through an appeal that does not depend on the hearer's antecedent attitudes, just as the frenzied, hateful rantings of Der Stürmer sometimes aimed to do. And, as for the cognitive and conative attitudes, perhaps this can sometimes be done by going on as if the hearer has the relevant attitude already. A speaker can invite someone into their hate-world by taking for granted that they are already in that hate-world.
A psychological accommodation then follows, as a causal effect of the attitudinal appeal. Hearers come to hate Jews.
Concluding remarks
I have tried to suggest how the phenomenon of accommodation might be extended beyond belief, to take in attitudes that are of central importance to our political thinking about hate speech and pornography. 39 These extensions could be of interest to our thinking about speech in more mundane contexts too. I am painfully aware that these are mere gestures in a direction where I would like to see some more action; but something in this direction is, I think, sorely needed.
As political philosophers, and philosophers of language too, we tend to be godlike in our habit of creating man in our own image: of creating human beings who match a philosophical ideal, rather than a social reality. We create paradigm political agents, whose chief interest in speech is a search for truth. We create paradigm speakers, whose chief interest in conversation is the spread of knowledge. But if we 39 Other ideas in the literature which may provide some help here include, perhaps, Paul
